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Résumé / Abstract 
 
 
In  the  field  of  economics,  a  vast  literature  has  attributed  the  rise  of  global  value  chains  to 
globalization-related  forces  such  as  declining  costs  of  transportation,  improvements  in 
communications technology, and institutional and policy reforms in developing countries. Through an 
in-depth review of the industry transformation in the electronics industry, however, we find that an 
additional relatively unexplored factor is the modularization of electronics products. We analyze the 
mechanisms through which product modularization may lead to the rise of global value chains and 
discuss the implications for future research. 
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1.  Introduction 
In the past three decades, the electronics industry has gone through a fundamental transformation 
of  its  organization  of  production.  Prior  to  the  1980s,  the  industry  was  dominated  by  large, 
vertically integrated firms  such as  IBM and DEC that produced most parts and components 
themselves and within their home country. Currently, the industry is dominated by lead firms 
that only specialize in a single slice of globally dispersed value chains. Similar trends have been 
documented in telecommunications [Li and Whalley, 2002], automobiles [Sturgeon and Florida, 
2000], chemicals [Arora et al., 2001] and textiles [Gereffi et al., 2005]. 
In  the  field  of  economics,  a  vast  literature  attributes  the  rise  of  global  value  chains  to 
globalization-related  forces  such  as  declining  costs  of  transportation,  improvements  in 
communications technology, and institutional and policy reforms in developing countries. Yet 
these explanations may not capture the entire story. Indeed, industry specialists and business 
scholars have pointed out that the strategic decision by lead  firms to  modularize electronics 
products  may  also  have  been  a  critical  driver  of  the  industry  transformation  [Dedrick  and 
Kraemer, 1998; Sturgeon and Lee, 2001; Sturgeon, 2002; Gereffi et al., 2005].  
This chapter has two goals. First, we will discuss product modularization and the mechanism 
through which it may have led to the rise of global value chains. Then we will consider the new 
insights  this  provides  for  our  understanding  of  global  value  chains,  as  well  as  the  potential 
implications for future research in this area. 
We have organized our chapter as follows.  In section 2, we conduct an in-depth review of 
electronics industry studies and business research to explain how product modularization could 
lead to the rise of global value chains in the electronics industry. In section 3, we demonstrate 
that the economics literature alone cannot fully explain these developments. In section 4, we 
draw on the business literature to explore some of the costs and benefits of modularity. We argue 
that the degree of modularity in at least some cases is an active decision variable for firms. Since 
both the degree of modularity and the organization of the firm are endogenous choice variables 
for the firm,  we  consider how  underlying factors  may have driven both modularity and the 
transformation  of  global  electronics  production.  Section  5  concludes  with  our  thoughts  on 
fruitful areas for future research. 2 
 
2.  Transformation in Global Electronics Production 
Today’s electronics industry landscape bears little resemblance to that of three decades  ago.  
Prior to the 1980s, the industry was dominated by large vertically integrated firms such as IBM, 
DEC, Fujitsu and Hitachi that produced most parts and components themselves (see Figure 1).  
Currently, industry leaders are no longer vertically integrated, but are rather firms that specialize 
in only a slice of electronics products’ value chains. Apple and Dell, for example, specialize in 
the design and marketing of products while outsourcing most of their components production 
and assembly to external firms. Contract manufacturing firms such as Flextronics and Foxconn 
are  the  principal  companies  in  the  manufacturing  and  assembly  segment.  Microsoft  is  the 
dominant firm in the operating system segment. Intel is the market leader in the microprocessor 
sector. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Baldwin and Clark [2000] have used stock market data to illustrate the speed and magnitude of 
this industry transformation. Figure 2 shows the market values in 1996 constant U.S. dollars of 
substantially all the public corporations in the computer industry from 1950 to 1996, broken out 
into  sixteen  subsectors  by  four-digit  standard  industrial  classification  (SIC)  codes.
1  In  the 
beginning of the sample, the market value of the electronics industry was highly concentrated in 
the SIC category ―3570-Computer and Office Equiment‖. This reflects that at that time market 
leaders (and especially IBM) were vertically integrated, while firms specializing in electronics 
subcategories  remained  relatively  rare.    Since  the  1980s,  the  market  has  changed.  Now  the 
market  value  of  the  electronics  industry  had  spread  out  over  various  subcategories  such  as 
―7372-Prepackaged software‖, ―3674-Semiconductors and related devices‖ and ―3576-Computer 
communication equipment‖. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
                                                           
1 3570-Computer and Office Equipment; 3571-Electronic Computers; 3572-Computer Storage Devices; 3575-
Computer Terminals; 3576-Computer Communication Equipment; 3577-Computer Peripheral Devices, n.e.c.; 3670-
Electronic Components and Accessories; 3672-Printed Circuit Boards; 3674-Semiconductors and Related Devices; 
3678-Electronic Connectors; 7370-Computer Programming, Data Processing, and Other Services; 7371-Computer 
Programming Services; 7372-Prepackaged Software; 7373-Computer Integrated Systems Design; 7374-Computer 
Processing, Data Preparation and Processing; 7377-Computer Leasing. 3 
 
Industry  specialists  and  business  scholars  attribute  the  industry  transformation  to  the 
modularization of electronics products [Dedrick and Kraemer, 1998; Sturgeon and Lee, 2001; 
Sturgeon, 2002; Gereffi et al., 2005]. To understand this, it is useful to first define product 
modularity. Ulrich [1995] describes a product as a combination of components or ―modules‖ that 
interact with one another according to the design rules of its product architecture. Depending on 
the number of  interdependencies between modules,  products  can vary  on a continuum  from 
integral  to  modular  [Schilling,  2000;  Gawer  and  Cusumano,  2002].  If  modules  are  highly 
interdependent, then a product is integral (Figure 3, top panel). In that case, any change made to 
a  module  needs  to  be  coordinated  with  other  modules  to  ensure  that there  is  no  significant 
reduction in the functionality of the final product. In contrast, if modules are independent from 
one another, then a product is modular (Figure 3, bottom panel). Changes can now be made to 
one module independently from other modules as long as the changes are compatible with the 
codified interfaces that govern the operability of the system.
2 
[Figure 3 about here] 
In the past three decades, electronics products have rapidly evolved from an integral to a modular 
product  architecture.  Prior  to  the  arrival  of  IBM's  System/360  computer,  leading  electronics 
companies  built  computers  with  a  fully  integral  architecture.  Each  company  designed  and 
manufactured its own operating system, processor, peripherals and application software. This 
implied a high cost of coordinating interoperability between components and required firms to 
produce almost all necessary components – semiconductors, hardware and operating systems – 
in-house and principally within one country [Dedrick and Kraemer, 1998; Chandler, 2001].  
For the production of the System/360 in the 1960s, IBM for the first time adopted a modular 
product architecture. The developers of the System/360 conceived of a family of computers that 
would include machines of different sizes suitable for different applications, all of which would 
use the same codified instruction set and could share the same peripherals. Future IBM products 
would all adhere to this modular system. To achieve the compatibility of components, IBM set 
up a Processor Control Office, which established and enforced open and codified standards that 
                                                           
2 PCs and cell phones are good examples of modular products. They are essentially a limited number of standard 
parts or modules (e.g., resistors, capacitors, and memory chips), which get mounted onto printed circuit boards in 
different combinations.  4 
 
determined how the different modules of the machine would work together [Baldwin and Clark, 
2000; Langlois, 2002]. This allowed the makers of components to concentrate their innovation 
efforts  at  a  reduced  coordination  cost  and  therefore  to  improve  their  module  of  the  system 
independently from others. 
This  adoption  of  a  modular  product  architecture  would  permanently  alter  the  structure  of 
production in the electronics industry. As we will see in the next sections, it would first move the 
electronics industry from vertical integration to horizontal concentration. Second, it would lead 
to a transformation from local to global value chains. 
2.1. From vertical integration to horizontal concentration 
In the early 1980s, product modularization led IBM to give up its vertically integrated production 
structure. In its scramble to bring to market its personal computer (PC) as a cheaper alternative to 
the popular Apple II, the industry giant turned to external suppliers for key components. The 
production of floppy disks was outsourced to Tandon, power supply to Zenith and circuit boards 
to SCI Systems. Furthermore, the production of the operating system and the microprocessor 
were outsourced to Microsoft and Intel. 
The PC was a dramatic success. As a result, the codified standards of interoperability, which 
IBM had set and made public to ensure a smooth collaboration with its external partners, rapidly 
became the de facto industry-wide standards, reducing the barriers to entry into the industry. 
Firms  were  now  able  to  specialize  in  a  single  slice  of  the  value  chain  without  needing  to 
coordinate extensively with other firms in the value chain. This enticed thousands of IBM clones 
and component producers to enter into the various niches of the computer business, reshaping the 
industrial landscape. Product modularity had led to the vertical disintegration of the electronics 
industry [Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Baldwin and Clark, 2000]. 
Beyond  leading  to  vertical  disintegration,  product  modularity  also  increased  market 
concentration within value chain segments [Sturgeon, 2002]. With the standards of compatibility 
and interoperability  fixed across the industry, firms could now produce generic modules for 
multiple  clients  and  purposes.  Microsoft  could  sell  their  operating  system  to  multiple  PC 
producers. Printers were compatible with most computer brands. Common semiconductors could 
be  used  inside  cell  phones,  television  sets,  personal  digital  assistants  and  computers.  This 5 
 
allowed component producers to take advantage of economies of scale and scope in engineering 
and manufacturing to grab market share in their industry segment, leading to heightened market 
concentration within value chain slices. 
Over time, vertical disintegration was pushed even further, with companies starting to specialize 
in only parts of modules. In the production of many electronics products, for example, design 
became separated from manufacturing [Sturgeon, 2002; Shih et al., 2009]. As a result, brand-
name  electronics  firms  such  as  Apple,  Hewlett-Packard,  IBM  and  Nokia  all  sold  off  their 
production facilities to a new type of electronics company, the contract manufacturer. These 
firms do not design or sell any brand-name products themselves. Rather, they specialize in using 
the same generic production routines to produce a wide range of electronics products, ranging 
from  computers,  communications  equipment,  consumer  electronics,  electronic  instruments, 
industrial electrical, medical, and military/aerospace [Sturgeon and Lee, 2001; Sturgeon, 2002].
3 
2.2. From Local to Global Value Chains
4 
Product modularization also led to a transformation from local to global value chains. As a part 
of the product modularization process, firms have widely relied on information technology (IT) 
such as business-to-business (B2B) technology to transfer codified information between product 
modules [Sturgeon, 2002]. This, in turn, has made it easier to perform tasks in geographically 
dispersed locations [Baldwin and Clark, 2008]. In line with the theory of comparative advantage, 
firms could keep their capital-intensive activities in developed countries, while offshoring labor-
intensive activities to developing countries [Dedrick and Kraemer, 1998].  
East  Asia  (Newly  Industrialized  Economies  (NIEs),  ASEAN-4  and  China)
5  was  seen as an 
especially  favorable place to move labor -intensive electronics production blocks .  First, the 
region had already demonstrated success in consumer electronics producti on as early as the 
1960s [Lowe and Kenney, 1999]. The region was known to have not only an abundant supply of 
low-wage labor but also a large and growing pool of high -skilled engineers. Second, East Asia 
had  a  relatively  stable  political  and  macroeconomic  environment,  conducive  to  long -term 
                                                           
3 Shih et al. [2009] describe a similar separation between design and manufacturing in the semiconductor industry. 
4 See Gangnes and Van Assche [2009; forthcoming] for an in-depth discussion of East Asia’s growing role in 
electronics value chains. See also Bonham et al. [2007] on the implications for trade patterns. 
5 The Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs) consist of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan; the 
Asian-4 are Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. 6 
 
investment projects and business relations [Yusuf, 2001]. Third, East Asian countries changed 
their  policy  stance  from  import  substitution  to  export  promotion,  providing  an  improved 
environment for international business linkages. 
As a result, East Asia rapidly turned into a global manufacturing base in electronics, producing 
electronic  products  primarily  destined  for  developed  countries  [Dedrick  and  Kraemer,  1998; 
Lowe and Kenney, 1999; Borrus et al., 2000]. In figure 4, we use electronics production data 
from Reed Electronics Research to illustrate the speed and process of East Asia’s rise [Reed 
Electronics Research, 2007]. The expansion occurred in three waves. The first wave saw the 
NIEs rapidly expand their electronics production. These countries initially specialized in labor-
intensive activities in consumer electronics products such as audio and video assembly, moving 
later into electronic data processing and other more sophisticated areas. Growth in the ASEAN-4 
countries took off in the early 1990s, when rising labor costs in the NIEs made ASEAN countries 
an  attractive  alternative.  The  third  and  perhaps  most  dramatic  wave  has  been  the  surge  of 
electronics production in China, which surpassed that of the NIEs in 2003. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
This rapid expansion has turned East Asia into the uncontested production hub for electronics 
products. As it is shown in Table 1, East Asia's share of world electronics production has gone 
from a mere 4.5 percent in 1985 to 41.2 percent in 2006, currently more than double the shares 
for Japan, the European Union and the United States.  
[Table 1 about here] 
 
2.3. Smile of value creation 
As a result of the industry transformation from vertical integration to horizontal concentration 
and from local to global value chains, scholars characterize modern value chains in electronics 
as a smiling curve [Shih, 1996; Everatt et al., 1999] or as the smile of value creation [Mudambi, 
2007, 2008]. Figure 5 illustrates how for many electronics products, developed-country firms 
have held on to high-value activities at the upstream (design) and downstream (marketing) ends 
of the value chain and have kept them in advanced economies. Conversely, they have outsourced 7 
 
low-value activities in middle of the value chain (manufacturing) to external companies and 
these  activities  have  moved  to  emerging  economies.  This  has  prompted  concerns  within 
developing countries about the limits to gains from electronics trade and the need for industrial 
upgrading to higher value added activities [Gangnes and Van Assche, 2009]. But it has also 
incited  the  fear  within  developed  countries  that  firms  are  outsourcing  too  much  of  their 
manufacturing capabilities and that this is undermining developed countries’ technological edge 
[Pisano and Shih, 2009].    
 [Figure 5 about here] 
3.  Perspectives From the Economics literature 
Despite a vast economics literature that analyzes the rise of global value chains, few studies have 
considered the role of product modularization.  In this section, we briefly review the existing 
economics literature and discuss how it fails to explain certain trends in the electronics industry’s 
industrial transformation. 
Economists  have  developed  three  streams  of  theoretical  models  to  explain  the  changing 
international organization of production witnessed in electronics and other global industries. A 
first stream has focused on the drivers of the transformation from local to global value chains, 
while ignoring changes  in the boundaries of the firms. The pioneering studies by Jones and 
Kierzkowski [1990, 2000] began with a Hecksher-Ohlin framework but divided the value chain 
for a good into two separate production blocks. If the production blocks are separable and have 
different  factor-intensities,  they  argue,  firms  in  labor-scarce  developed  countries  have  an 
incentive to relocate labor-intensive production blocks to labor-abundant developing countries. 
Firms will only do so, however, if the benefits of fragmenting their production process exceed 
the extra trade, communication and governance costs of coordinating activities across borders.
6 
This framework thus allowed Jones and Kierzkowski [1990, 2000] and its successors to identify 
three globalization-related drivers for the international fragmentation of production: reductions in 
transportation costs, declines in communication costs, and pro-trade policy reforms.  
To explain the  concomitant  rise in  offshore  outsourcing, a  second stream of literature   has 
introduced elements of the theory of the firm into general-equilibrium trade models (see Spencer, 
                                                           
6 Other contributions include Venables [1999] and Jones and Findlay [2000, 2001].   8 
 
2005,  and  Helpman,  2006,  for  a  review  of  this  literature).  In  this  type  of  study,  a  firm 
concurrently makes a two-dimensional choice: (i) whether to produce its components in-house or 
to outsource its production to another firm, and (ii) whether to make its components domestically 
or  offshore.  The  studies  generally  find  that  the  same  drivers  of  international  production 
fragmentation also make outsourcing more attractive: reductions in trade costs [Antràs, 2003; 
Antràs  and  Helpman,  2004];  improvements  in  communication  technology  [Grossman  and 
Helpman,  2002];  and  trade  liberalization  [McLaren,  2000;  Ornelas  and  Turner,  2008]. 
Furthermore,  they  find  that  improvements  in  the  institutional  environment  of  developing 
countries can further induce offshore outsourcing [Antràs and Helpman, 2008]. 
The two streams of literature have provided important insights into the drivers of international 
production fragmentation and outsourcing. Yet, when compared to the industrial transformation 
that we have documented in the electronics industry, they face two shortcomings. First, they 
have little to say about the concomitant change in product technology. Specifically, they do not 
consider  that  the  modularization  of  products  may  have  made  it  easier  for  firms  to  separate 
production  blocks  and  move  them  in  different  locations,  therefore  inducing  the  documented 
offshoring  and  outsourcing  trends.  Second,  they  cannot  explain  the  increase  in  market 
concentration seen in many slices of the value chain. Indeed, a standard assumption in the studies 
described above is that inputs are completely specific so that component suppliers can only sell 
their output to a single final good firm. This assumption rules out that market concentration may 
differ across value chain slices.  
A third stream of papers has recently made some inroads in explaining the role of technological 
change  by  focusing  on  the growing role of  IT  in  international  business, which has  been an 
important part of the modularization process. Leamer and Storper [2001] distinguish between 
tasks  that  require  codifiable  information  and  those  that  require  tacit  information.  Tacit 
information,  they  argue,  cannot  be  conveyed  in  symbols,  and  therefore  require  face-to-face 
communication. Conversely, codifiable information can be expressed in a symbol system and 
can therefore be more easily transferred from a distance. Autor et al. [2003], Levy and Murnane 
[2004] and Blinder [2006] build on this insight to point out that tasks performed by a computer 
can be more easily performed remotely with relatively little risk of miscommunication and a 9 
 
modest  cost  of  monitoring.
7  If  then  firms  decide to  adopt more IT for their international 
transactions (perhaps because of product modularization), this can induce the documented rise in 
offshoring [Blinder, 2006; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008]. 
The two shortcomings mentioned above remain, however, in this stream of literature. The studies 
cannot explain the increased horizontal concentration in value chain segments. Furthermore, they 
treat the technological change as exogenous, thus failing to address the question of why firms (in 
some industries) decide to adopt modular product architectures.  As we shall see in the next 
section, this is a complex question that requires a theory of product modularity. 
4.  Modularity as a Strategic Decision 
A firm’s decision regarding which product architecture to adopt is a complex strategic question 
that needs to consider multiple facets. Firms face various trade-offs when choosing between an 
integral and modular product architecture. On the one hand, they face a static trade-off that 
affects their cost structure in the short run. On the one hand, they face a dynamic trade-off that 
affects their innovation efforts. We consider these two trade-offs in turn.  
Consider first the static trade-off. The key benefit of an integral product architecture is that it can 
lead  to  synergistic  productivity  gains  related  to  components  being  specific  to  one  another 
[Schilling, 2000]. Conversely, an important advantage of a modular product architecture is that it 
reduces input specificity by allowing the same generic components to be shared across multiple 
product families and/or firms. This leads to three benefits. First, component sharing can lower 
the price of components by allowing its producers to take advantage of economies of scale and 
scope [Baldwin and Clark, 2000]. Second, it increases flexibility by allowing firms to more 
easily substitute certain components of a technological system while reusing others [Garud and 
Kumaraswamy,  1995;  Schilling,  2000].  Dell,  for  example,  relies  on  its  modular  production 
structure to provide clients with customized laptop computers by altering the combination of 
components  in  the  computer.  Apple  iPad  customers  can  easily  customize  their  devices  by 
choosing which applications to download. Third, lower input specificity can reduce the hold-up 
friction in outsourcing relations [Van Assche and Schwartz, 2010]. Component suppliers are no 
                                                           
7 The authors use slightly different terms. While Leamer and Stolper [2001] distinguish between codifiable versus 
tacit information, Autor et al. [2003] and Levy and Murnane [2004] talk about routine and nonroutine tasks.  
Blinder [2006] emphasizes the need for physical contact when delivering the output of a task. 10 
 
longer destined to sell their product to one or few customers, therefore improving their outside 
option and reducing the hold-up problem that is inherent to a setting of asset specificity and 
incomplete contracts [Williamson, 1985; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990]. 
Firms  also  face  a dynamic trade-off when choosing their product  architecture.  According to 
Baldwin and Clark [1997, 2000], one of the main benefits of modularizing a product architecture 
is  that  it  can  reduce  the  complexity  and  increase  the  predictability  of  innovation.  Product 
modularity reduces the interdependencies between modules, therefore allowing researchers and 
engineers to independently concentrate their capabilities on innovating a single module. This, 
however, does not come without risks. Modular systems may in the long term lead to fewer 
innovative breakthroughs than integral systems [Fleming and Sorenson, 2001].  Furthermore, 
outsourcing  modules  to  external  suppliers  may  make  firms  lose  their  ability  to  control  key 
intellectual property [Zirpoli and Becker, 2011] and may eventually lead to the creation of future 
competitors [Arrunada and Vazquez, 2006]. If many firms outsource too much, it may even 
undermine a country’s technological edge [Pisano and Shih, 2009]. 
A theoretical framework that models one or more of these trade-offs will generate new insights 
into the drivers of product modularization. Furthermore, introducing such as framework into a 
general  equilibrium  model  of  international  production  may  also  allow  us  to  gain  new 
perspectives on the changing organization of international production, and the implications for 
innovations and growth. 
Two  recent  papers  demonstrate  the  potential  of  this  research  stream.  Van  Assche  (2008) 
developed  a  theoretical  model  to  analyze  under  which  circumstances  the  modularization  of 
products can explain the concurrent trend from vertical integration to horizontal concentration 
and  from  local  to  global  value  chains.  For  this  purpose,  he  built  a  two-country  general 
equilibrium model in  which firms  not  only  choose their ownership structure (integration vs. 
outsourcing)  and  location  of  input  production  (home  vs.  offshore),  but  also  their  product 
architecture (integral vs. modular). In doing so, they need to consider the static trade-off: while 
the  integral  architecture  increases  productivity,  the  modular  architecture  reduces  input 
specificity. Using this setup, he demonstrates that technological change that makes it easier to 
use generic components (such as an IT revolution) not only leads to the adoption of modular 
product architectures, but also induces the two concurrent trends from vertical integration to 11 
 
horizontal concentration and from local to global value chains. Specifically, it then becomes 
optimal  for  vertically  integrated  firms  to  outsource  component  production  to  foreign  input 
suppliers that uses the same generic production process for multiple final good firms.  
In  a  similar  spirit,  Thoenig  and  Verdier  [2010]  built  a  general  equilibrium  model  in  which 
innovating  firms  can  choose  whether  or  not  to  codify  the  transfer  of  information  with  its 
suppliers (which is a necessary part of the modularization process). They, however, focus on the 
dynamic  trade-off  of  product  modularization.  On  the  one  hand,  they  argue,  codification  of 
information  enables  verifiability  by  a  third  party  and  therefore  allows  the  design  of  more 
efficient  contracts.  On  the  other  hand,  codification  leads  to  increased  possibilities  of 
informational spillover to third parties who might exploit these spillovers to out-compete the 
initial  contracting  group.  They  find  that  in  industries  with  high  technological  competition, 
companies should codify their information transfer less, therefore formally demonstrating that 
product modularization may make firms lose their ability to control key intellectual property 
[Zirpoli and Becker, 2011] and may lead to the creation of future competitors [Arrunada and 
Vazquez, 2006]. 
Further research is needed in this area. A number of issues remain unadressed. One technical 
issue that has not yet been analyzed is how product modularization affects hold-up problems in 
outsourcing relations. Introducing this feature into a model à la Antràs and Helpman [2004] may 
enrich  our  understanding  of  what  type  of  firms  are  more  likely  to  choose  modular  product 
architectures, and how this affects their organizational form. 
Another issue that remains poorly understood is what the positive and normative implications are 
for competition policy. If product modularization induces an industry to move from vertical 
integration to horizontal concentration, this may (or may not) increase the bargaining power of 
the  component  producer  and  provide  it  with  monopoly  power,  thus  affecting  the  market 
structure. This may require us to rethink competition policy in a modular world. 
Tied up with this is also the question how this affects innovation and the global distribution of 
benefits  from  production  and  trade.  For  a  firm,  what  is  the  optimal  degree  of  product 
modularization?  From  a  development  perspective,  how  does  product  modularization  affect 
developing country firms’ ability to upgrade and catch-up technologically?   12 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
We have in this chapter demonstrated  that the rise of global value chains in the electronics 
industry is not solely due to globalization-related drivers such as reductions in trade costs and 
communication costs, but also stems from a fundamental change in the technological architecture 
used to produce goods. Product modularization has enabled firms to slice up their value chains 
and to outsource segments to external firms that can be located anywhere around the world. This, 
in turn, has led to an increase in market concentration within value chain segments. 
Further  theoretical  research  is  needed  to  understand  the  role  of  product  modularity  in  the 
organization of international production. We have argued that the degree of modularity is not 
completely exogenous, but is to a certain extent a strategic choice variable for the firm. This then 
begs the question why firms have decided en masse to modularize their product architectures, 
and whether this has been an optimal decision for a firm and for society. We have argued that a 
better understanding of this will lead to important new insights into innovation and the global 
distribution of benefits from production and trade.  
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Figure 2 : Market Value of the Computer Industry by Sector in constant 1996 U.S. Dollars.  
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Figure 4: East Asian electronics production (US$ millions) 
 
       Source: Authors’ calculations, using data from Reed Electronics Research. 














Figure 5: The Smile of Value Creation 
 
Source: Mudambi [2008]. 
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Table 1: Growth of Electronics Production, 1985-2006 
  Electronics Production 
Value (US$ Millions) 
CAGR (%)  Share of world electronics 
production (%) 
Country  1985  2006  1985-2006  1985  2006 
East Asia    17,323     624,433  18.6 
 
  4.5  41.2 
   NIEs    13,552     217,402  14.1    3.5  14.4 
      South Korea    5,881     117,426  15.3    1.5  7.8 
      Singapore    4,032       51,760  1.2    1.1  0.3 
      Taiwan    —       44,460  —    —  0.3 
      Hong Kong    3,639         3,756  0.2    1.0  0.2 
   ASEAN-4    3,771     104,988  17.2    1.0  6.9 
      Malaysia    1,829       52,711  17.4    20.5  3.5 
      Thailand    435       24,875  21.2    0.1  1.6 
      Philippines    831       15,167  14.8    0.2  1.0 
      Indonesia    676       12,235  14.8    0.2  0.8 
   China    —     302,043  —    —  19.9 
United States    175,014     293,896  2.5    45.7  19.4 
EU-15 (Excl.)    64,715     232,528  6.3    16.9  15.4 
Japan     87,038     196,573  4.0    22.7  13.0 
Mexico       —       39,931  —  —  2.6 
Total Market    383023  1,514,816  6.8    100.0  100.0 
Source: Reed Electronics Research 
 